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Abstract: Activists associated with the Black Lives Matter movement embrace anger. Owning their rage 
sets these activists in opposition to an older generation of black leaders, invested in respectability, who 
narrate anger as an emotion to be overcome. Younger activists worry about complicity with the status 
quo – with white supremacy – of these older activists, yet embracing anger is no surefire way of avoiding 
complicity with the status quo. This essay investigates the ambivalence of black anger, drawing on 
philosophy and feminist theory while also locating the current eruption of black anger in an ambivalent 
history of black political affect. In laboratory conditions, anger tracks moral wrongs, but we do not live 
in a laboratory. We live in a world filled with systems of domination, including white supremacy, and in 
such circumstances, the wrongs to which anger points are often obscured. Feminist theorists including 
Audre Lorde and María Lugones offer strategies for clarifying and embracing rightly-directed anger in 
such circumstances, and for allowing such anger to be politically productive. These strategies help in 
attending to the anger described in recent memoirs written by young, Black Lives Matter-associated 
activists. Yet deep ambivalence remains: anger as an affect, anger as a rhetorical strategy, and anger 
as a trope slip into each other in these texts. Embracing anger may promise a way of escaping complicity, 
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The Ambivalence of Black Rage 
 
The phrase “black lives matter” is the most visible element of a much broader new vocabulary young 
people in black American communities are using to talk about race today. This has happened before: 
the language of black advocacy shifted swiftly and dramatically from the Christian idiom of the civil 
rights movement in the 1950s and early 1960s to the secular idiom of the black power movement in the 
late 1960s and 1970s, a language that would gradually fade and be incorporated into the multicultural 
status quo over the rest of the twentieth century and into the start of the twenty-first century. Since 
the murder of 17-year-old Trayvon Martin in 2012 and 18-year-old Michael Brown in 2014, 
multiculturalism no longer reigns; a realignment is taking place. It is originating in black American 
spaces, particularly those frequented by millennials, in person and in social media. The hashtag 
BlackLivesMatter emerged from these spaces and was embraced by mainstream, multiracial liberals, an 
anomaly in vocabularies still dominated by multiculturalism. But “black lives matter” is just one element 
of a broad new language that counts among its pillars “anti-blackness,” “black love,” “black joy,” “black 
girl magic,” “misogynoir,” and “dignity.” 
Another pillar of this new black political discourse is “rage.” It circulates in social media spaces and 
finds expression at meetings and rallies. The embrace of rage is part of a revaluation of values central 
to the new black activism. Within this discourse, earlier generations are perceived to have a commitment 
to respectability that needs to be discarded. It is replaced with rage. Like much of the new black political 
vocabulary, rage is conceptualized by drawing on a distinctive set of theoretical resources, most 
prominently the writings of James Baldwin, Audre Lorde, and bell hooks. These intellectuals’ work was 
always part of black studies within the academy and in black feminist spaces, but it has now been given 
the leading role in defining the terms of black political engagement. And each of these intellectuals 
speaks of black rage.  
When considering a certain discourse, and particularly a newly emerging discourse, it is often difficult 
to determine how far down it goes. This problem is exacerbated by the tendency of social media to 
rapidly disseminate words and phrases without providing the space or time for reflection. Minimally, a 
new discourse would simply be providing new words to express old ideas and to describe old patterns 
of action. But words shape thought, and a new political vocabulary allows for new approaches to 
problems and makes new responses thinkable. A new discourse thus also shapes perceptions and 
actions. With a set of new words and new ways of thinking, young black activists notice new problems 
and experiment with new forms of response. Moreover, a new discourse has the potential, if fully 
embraced, to shape the emotions. In other words, it might be that rage is just a word that is employed 
much more often than it used to be by young black activists, or it might be the case that these activists 
feel rage, and the combination of this language and feeling (along with others) is a crucial component 
of our current political moment.1 
This equivocation between language of emotion and felt emotion is one that I want to hold on to as 
I explore black rage. But I do want to take black rage as it is felt seriously, because those young black 
activists catalyzing the swirl of new discourse take it seriously. The aim of those activists is to revalue 
rage for the purposes of dissent. Their claim is that rage was once suppressed, or its expression was 
unfocused. Today, with the new discourse of black self-assertion, black Americans can own their rage, 
and so they can direct it properly against the forces of white supremacy. This is a bold claim and one 
that, on its surface, sounds like a product of our therapeutic age: If only we can be in touch with our 
emotions, we can solve our problems. Might it be the case that black rage pulls away from engagement 
with normativity – both of the world as it is and the world as it could be, leaving both intact as we focus 
on our own self-actualization? Is black rage actually complicit with the powers that be rather than a 
challenge to the powers that be? In what follows I will engage with, though ultimately not resolve, the 
ambivalence of black rage. 
 
Feeling Angry 
Hatred is quite different from anger. As William Galston puts it, “Anger is directed to agency, hatred to 
identity. We feel angry because of what someone has done, hatred because of who someone is” (97). 
Anger is felt when we are wronged. When we are children, we may be angry that we do not get what 
we desire right away (the lollipop, the extra playtime, the blue ribbon). Once we mature, we feel 
                                                 
1  Pace Debra Thompson, who forecloses this line of questioning when she writes, “Emotions are etched onto 
cardboard signs at BLM rallies across the country” (458). 
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frustrated, not angry, when we encounter obstacles to our desires. We have been taken into the 
normative order, doing what is done, desiring what is to be desired. Anger now may come when things 
and people do not do what they are supposed to do: when the vending machine does not give us a soda, 
when we fill out the right paperwork but the bureaucracy loses our application, or when our partner 
makes a commitment and then reneges. We are wronged: what ought to have happened did not happen. 
Anger also results when we are dishonored or, to put it another way, when our dignity is violated. This 
is a special class of the wrongs involved in failures of the normative order. One aspect of that order is 
treating each person in the proper way, that is, according to his or her specific status (honor) or 
according to his or her status as human (dignity). When my honor or dignity are violated, I am wronged, 
and anger follows. Observing anger means knowing that some wrong has been committed, so anger 
alerts that a question of morality may be at issue. 
Anger, however, has a tendency to miss the mark. Sometimes this is simply a matter of 
misperception. We think that a norm is being violated, but on closer inspection of the situation we realize 
we misunderstood the norm or the facts of the case. We thought the meeting was at 2, we were angry 
that our colleague was late, then we realized that our appointment was for 2:30. Or we realize we are 
visiting a place where there is a cultural norm that meetings generally begin a half hour late. Or we 
realize that there is some other norm that trumped the norm of timeliness: our colleague’s sister was 
hospitalized, for example. Similar forms of misperception happen in cases of honor and dignity. The 
general is angered when he thinks he was being dishonored by the soldier who failed to salute him, then 
he realizes that he is in a restaurant in civilian clothes. In cultural contexts where family is valued as an 
essential part of what makes one human, a stranger might mistakenly fail to inquire about the health 
of a new acquaintance’s parents, slighting her dignity and prompting anger – until the cultural difference 
comes to light. 
Deeper problems also hamper our ability to take anger as evidence of wrongness. For reasons that 
may be individual or social, psychological or cultural, individuals may struggle to express anger. Anger 
constipation, as it were, can result in a host of problems. Anger can turn inward, focused on the self, 
and so become self-hatred, perhaps resulting in depression. Anger can be withheld at moments it is 
warranted and instead shoot out at inappropriate occasions and in inappropriate quantities, resulting in 
seemingly unprovoked blind rage. For those not properly socialized, not brought into the normative 
order, what ought to be frustration can be expressed as anger, with this anger prompted by the inability 
to obtain a desired object rather than by failure to follow norms or to act according to honor or dignity. 
There may be ideological forces that mute anger. This claim is often found in feminist literature where 
scholars observe that patriarchy prevents women from being able to express their anger, even to 
themselves.2 Relatedly, when women do express anger, patriarchy makes it such that this anger is often 
dismissed as unwarranted or exaggerated, in other words as not fitting with a moral wrong. Another 
problem: ideological forces make it so that some minority groups’ expressions of emotions other than 
anger, or even just speech that expresses contested opinions, are taken to be anger. In other words, 
anger is over-ascribed to some minority groups (e.g., black Americans) with the result that the credibility 
of all expressions of anger made by members of that minority group is reduced. At the end of the day, 
members of such a minority group are effectively deprived of the ability to signal wrongness by means 
of anger. And the problem compounds: being unable to have one’s anger heard is itself a moral wrong, 
prompting more anger, anger that itself cannot be heard, and on ad infinitum. Pursuing this set of 
concerns leads us toward black rage. 
Here we see one of the difficulties of anger. The distortion of anger by ideological forces can be 
difficult to distinguish from the distortion of anger by psychological or cultural forces. And this is used 
to the advantage of those in positions of domination. To invoke the classic example, a man claims that 
the angry woman is suffering from a psychological impairment, such as hysteria, or white Americans 
claim that black American culture predisposes black Americans to anger. But in this difficulty also lies 
promise. If we can develop the resources to rightly discern the anger of dominated communities, we 
can expose the workings of ideology, for the anger of dominated communities in part tracks the 
wrongness of domination. Yet if dominated communities are constantly being pulled into a loop of ever-
amplifying anger, with visible anger motivated by the suppression of anger rather than the underlying 
wrong, it would seem nearly impossible to unravel these layers of anger so as to realize the promise of 
dominated communities’ anger illuminating the shape of domination. 
                                                 
2 Marilyn Frye claims that first wave feminists succeeded in making it possible to hear women’s anger when they 
took the role of mother, for example on child welfare issues and prohibition, but left women’s anger muted when it 
pertained to themselves (84-94). 
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Let us approach another way, clarifying how it is that anger might assist in struggles for justice. So 
far, we have been considering anger of an abstract other, but let us now consider one’s own anger. The 
story philosophers tell about reasoning about justice, usually portrayed as a rather heartless enterprise, 
might be enhanced by reflecting on one’s feelings of anger in addition to one’s ability to reason. Noticing 
that a certain situation evokes anger provides a prima facie reason to think there is injustice (See 
Lapoutre). You can then focus your reasoning powers, and emotional attention, at that situation and 
others like it so as to enhance your sensitivity to questions of justice. Filmmakers and orators who 
succeed in evoking anger in their audiences share more than we might think with moral philosophers, 
in this view. When Frederick Douglass or Malcolm X make their audience angry about slavery or 
segregation, they prompt the audience member to notice aspects of her world that she may have 
otherwise overlooked, and to look in those places for injustice. Note how, on this account, there is no 
one-to-one connection between anger and moral infraction; rather, anger prompts investigation for 
moral infraction, and so the concerns about anger’s distortions are mitigated. 
Another version of this use of anger for moral discernment involves tracking anger associated with 
feelings of indignation (e.g., Bromell). When you feel indignant or you observe others expressing feelings 
of indignation you are able to tell that a specific sort of wrong is being done, namely, an offense against 
dignity (or honor). Indignation would seem to suffer less from distortions afflicting other types of anger. 
Even when other angers are muted or over-ascribed, such as in the woman fully indoctrinated by 
patriarchy or black Americans viewed through white supremacist glasses, feelings of indignation remain 
perceptible. Sometimes they result from disrespect, treating an individual as though she has less 
standing than she really has. Yet the problem with indignation is that while it may be an effective marker 
of wrongs committed against those in the most marginalized communities, who have so little standing 
that indignation necessarily tracks offense to the most basic form of human dignity, those with relatively 
greater standing feel indignation when their social status is threatened, not only when the basics of their 
human dignity is threatened.  
So far we have been thinking with Aristotle’s observation in the Nicomachean Ethics that “apparent 
injustice” brings about anger (1135b29). Reacting too strongly or too weakly to perceived injustice is 
vicious; Aristotle, as always, recommends the mean. But Aristotle offers another definition of anger, 
this one in his Rhetoric: “A desire accompanied by pain for an imagined retribution on account of an 
imagined slighting inflicted by people who have no legitimate reason to slight oneself or one’s own” 
(qtd. in Nussbaum 17). The focus here is forward-looking, toward retribution, rather than backward-
looking, toward a wrong committed. Martha Nussbaum has recently urged that Aristotle’s observation 
about the forward-looking nature of anger is correct – and this is a reason to reject anger altogether. 
Would it not be better for us to avoid cycles of vengeance and instead aim at reconciliation through 
hope for forgiveness?  
That anger motivates action against those who inflect wrongs is an attractive feature of anger to 
some theorists of anger from marginalized communities. But if marginalization runs deep, effecting how 
a community sees the world and itself, forgiveness and reconciliation do not seem like viable goals. In 
such cases, the dominating and the dominated communities effectively live in different worlds. 
Forgiveness and reconciliation entail merging worlds, and given the posited power differential, such a 
merger is really a hostile takeover. The incommensurability between worlds strains the ability of the 
two individuals to even agree on the wrong that was committed, let alone how it might be righted. The 
problem is exacerbated when we consider how an individual in the dominating group stands in for a 
system of domination. That individual may be doing what she ought to do, following the norms of the 
dominating community. A member of the dominated community may then be wronged proximately by 
that one individual but really by the system of domination (patriarchy, white supremacy, etc.) as a 
whole. 
Initially, the anger expressed by a member of the dominated community may seek retribution from 
one particular member of the dominating community. But very quickly it becomes clear that this is 
ineffective and confused. The system of domination seeks to capture the anger of the dominated, muting 
it or channeling it or commodifying it (e.g., Malcolm X t-shirts). A crucial project of emancipatory politics, 
then, is to provide a framework for “reading” anger rightly. The more robust the framework, the more 
it can resist attempts to mute, channel, or commodify anger. Sara Ahmed defines this as an essential 
project of feminism, to move “from anger into an interpretation of that which one is against, whereby 
associations or connections are made between the object of anger and broader patterns or structures” 
(176). When feminism succeeds in providing such a framework, it demonstrates that anger is 
“reasonable,” and Ahmed urges feminists to insist on this in their activism even when they know most 
of the time those with power will ignore or dismiss feminist anger. One day, Ahmed seems to be claiming, 
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when the political moment is right, feminists may win, and the framework of their anger will be 
recognized as reasonable by all.3  
Audre Lorde talks about black women’s ability to make anger into a “‘symphony’ rather than 
‘cacophony’ because we have had to learn to orchestrate those furies so that they do not tear us apart” 
(129). Given the incommensurability between the world of black American women and the dominant 
world, there is no straightforward method to identifying and pursuing wrongs or even systems of wrongs 
inflicted by white supremacy through the actions of white individuals (and institutions). It takes a subtle 
skill for black women to attune themselves to their anger, Lorde suggests, “to listen to its rhythms, to 
learn within it”; anger at its best can be used “for strength and force and insight within our daily lives” 
(130). There is a necessarily mysterious element to this process, but it is ultimately liberating. Anger 
will “help define and fashion a world where all our sisters can grow, where our children can love, and 
where the power of touching and meeting another woman’s difference and wonder will eventually 
transcend the need for destruction” (133). Lorde’s claim is that the desire for retribution looks quite 
different when we take a view from the margins. Rather than propelling a cycle of vengeance, the anger 
of the dominated, when symphonic, can motivate engagement in ordinary life, including persistence in 
the face of travails, and it can conjure a new, better world. When anger among the marginalized is 
symphonic, those who are marginalized know that the travails they face do not represent the way the 
world is supposed to be, that they are unjust; the world could be otherwise.  
The difficulty with Lorde’s view is that the more opaque the world of the dominated is from the 
perspective of the dominant, the less that can be said about what happens in the world of the dominated 
from outside that world. The vision of a new world that Lorde suggests symphonic anger can generate, 
motivating the marginalized to imagine radically otherwise, is made possible by incommensurability, but 
this same incommensurability renders the content of their imaginings inaccessible. María Lugones 
responds to this problem by embracing incommensurability and thinning out the content of anger’s 
vision of the future. Lugones distinguishes first-order anger, anger that tracks wrongs within a normative 
world, and second-order anger, anger that is essentially opaque and interrupts the normative world, 
reminding its inhabitants that their world could be radically otherwise. From the perspective of an 
inhabitant of one normative world, expressing first-order anger in one’s own normative world 
demonstrates respectability, that one is a competent participant in the world, worthy of respect. 
Expressing first-order anger in one normative world has no significance in another and generates no 
world-crossing sense of respect, but second-order anger does cross worlds. It takes practice to learn to 
ignore first-order anger in other normative worlds, for the dominated to desensitize themselves to the 
anger of those who dominate. Such anger would seem to track wrongs that call for response, but to try 
to track such anger and respond to those wrongs is to subject oneself to abuse, for it is impossible to 
stretch across the divide between normative worlds.  
Second-order anger, in Lugones’s view, is often dismissed as irrational. This is because such anger 
does not seem motivated by reason: while there is no particular wrong that was committed, there is 
still anger. “Yet, when I have observed women in hard-to-handle [second-order] anger, they have been 
outrageously clearheaded; their words clean, true, undiluted by regard for others’ feelings or possible 
reactions” (107). While such anger may ostensibly be about this or that, its effect transcends any 
particular content. Observing such anger provincializes your own normative world, your confidence that 
reason and feeling follow the patterns with which you are familiar, even though no content is 
communicated about that other world. When we see such anger anywhere we intuit that the one angered 
demands respect (or, better, dignity), that she must be a competent member of some normative world, 
even if that world is outside of our horizon. Lugones argues that such second-order anger, which she 
describes as rage or “separatist anger,” constitutes a community of sorts that transcends the divides 
between incommensurable worlds, and “its harshness attests to the hardness of the walls against which 
and over which it echoes” (112).  
Lugones’s account of rage seems to approximate what recent black American activists intend when 
they use the language of black rage, but this leads back to a problem. It is hard to say to what extent 
black rage is felt today; what is clear is that it is narrated. It is narrated as part of one’s own story, at 
the center of recent memoirs by young activists, and it is narrated as part of the history of black 
American struggle. But essential to Lugones’s account of rage is rage’s resistance to communication 
(while still being “outrageously clearheaded”).  
 
                                                 
3 Ahmed moves immediately from a section on anger to a section on hope. There are interesting parallels with Cornel 
West’s assertion that a commitment to love undergirds expressions of black rage at their best, with an eye toward 
the case of Malcolm X (96). 
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Situating Black Rage 
While there is a self-consciousness in the writings of young black activists about the novelty of their 
discourse, about just how different it is from that of their elders and those in generations before, there 
is also a desire to root their discourse in a tradition of black (often beyond black-American) struggle. 
Some of those who came before attempted to express black rage, the activists say, but they did it 
imperfectly, not attending to certain issues (particularly around gender and sexuality) that today’s 
discourse has more fully considered. Certain theorists aid in making connections between the current 
movement and the history of black struggle, with bell hooks as a leading bridge figure. Her 1995 book 
Killing Rage offers a characteristically clear analysis and historicization of the topic, and indeed she 
centers rage in part because “Sharing rage connects those of us who are older and more experienced 
with younger black and non-black folks who are seeking ways to be self-actualized, self-determined, 
who are eager to participate in anti-racist struggle” (19-20). According to hooks, in the segregated 
South “Black people could die from feeling rage and expressing it to the wrong white folks. We learned 
to choke down our rage” (13). Segregation eased this repression because the separate racial worlds 
made it possible for black Southerners to live their lives in minimal contact with whites, so with few 
proximate objects of rage. Yet because the system of racial domination was there, rage was still there, 
just infrequently activated (and, when activated, almost always muted). 
After segregation ended, black Americans, and particularly those with some degree of worldly 
success, increasingly came into contact with whites – providing more occasions for rage to be activated 
and requiring all the more effort to suppress that rage. Now rage-suppression is motivated not only by 
fear of violence and death at the hands of whites but also by the desire for advancement, by the thought 
that more success can be had in a white world if black rage is nowhere to be found. Integration also 
provided more blacks with opportunities to exist in spaces where white terror was not felt so acutely, 
and so where black rage could be countenanced. Like Lugones’s description of second-order anger, 
hooks describes rage that pulls singular individuals apart from their worlds, thrusting them into an 
unknown future. “A black person unashamed of her rage, using it as a catalyst to develop critical 
consciousness, to come to full decolonized self-actualization, had no real place in the existing social 
structure” (16). Writing of her own experiences leaning into rage, hooks writes, “I felt like an exile.” 
She observes that rage “had the potential not only to destroy but also to construct,” and it “can act as 
a catalyst inspiring courageous action” (16). 
In 1995, hooks’s anger made her feel like an exile, but twenty years later it would have put her in 
plenty of good company. Anger came back. Mychal Denzel Smith penned a pair of essays in The Nation 
accounting for anger’s return in black America, “The Function of Black Rage” in 2014 and “The Rebirth 
of Black Rage” in 2015. By the time Smith entered the conversation, and by the time the new racial 
justice activism took off, mainstream commentators had declared black anger over, for example in 
psychologist Ellis Cose’s 2011 book The End of Anger: A New Generation’s Take on Race and Rage. 
Smith argues that anger animated the civil rights movement and the black power movement, motivating 
black Americans to organize for racial justice. Like hooks, he sees integration bringing about decline in 
a certain way. When black political energies turn toward electoral politics, anger becomes a liability 
rather than an asset. For a while anger can be found in politically-conscious rap music, in groups like 
N.W.A. and Tupac, but that, too, fades into the apolitical embrace of multiculturalism that was 1990s 
and 2000s America. Al Sharpton was an anomaly, and “his expressions of rage were diluted by his 
celebrity-activist status and the larger-than-life persona that made him a prime target for caricature” 
(Smith, “The Rebirth of Black Rage”). In other words, the anger of figures like Sharpton was not taken 
seriously.  
Barack Obama represents the nadir of black anger, in Smith’s account, with Obama’s race speech 
during his 2008 campaign in which he renounced his association with his former pastor, Jeremiah Wright, 
exemplary. Wright embodied black rage, and when Wright’s fiery words, including “God damn America!,” 
began circulating widely and threatening Obama’s candidacy, Obama was pressed to respond. In a 
speech widely praised by the liberal media, Obama situates Wright’s anger within the experiences of a 
generation for whom “the memories of humiliation and doubt and fear have not gone away” (Obama). 
In black spaces, Obama explains, survivors of segregation continue to express their anger, even if it is 
foreign to racially mixed and white spaces. Obama insists that Wright’s anger is “real”— that is, properly 
responsive to a moral wrong — but he adds that “similar anger exists within segments of the white 
community” who have worked hard yet experience economic precarity, and white anger is also real. 
Both white and black anger call for acknowledgment, at which point we will be able to start “working 
together” in order to “move beyond some of our old racial wounds” and “continue on the path of a more 
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perfect union.” Obama presented himself as embodying this possibility of moving forward together, of 
setting aside anger over wounds of the past.4 
Obama’s public performance was nearly anger-free. But observers suspected that anger lurked 
underneath, deeply repressed, an intuition that found expression in the comedian Keegan-Michael Key’s 
performance as Luther, Obama’s fictional “anger translator.” Key was part of a wider, more serious set 
of public expressions of black anger that slowly emerged in the lead up to the deaths of Trayvon Martin 
and Michael Brown. Smith identifies Kanye West going off-script in a Katrina fundraiser to declare, 
“George Bush doesn’t care about black people” as a crucial moment in this emergence (“The Rebirth of 
Black Rage”). In the years that followed, black millennials would identify Obama with their parents, with 
desires for respectability, and perhaps with complicity in the evils of the status quo, in contrast with 
their own experiences of continuing racism in need of response. This sentiment went mainstream with 
the success of Ta-Nehisi Coates’s Between the World and Me, a book Smith reads not so much as an 
expression of pessimism but as an expression of warranted anger, representing the sentiments of a 
generation. 
Smith’s narrative draws our attention to an important question of interpretation with respect to 
anger. Rarely do people who feel anger use the words, “I am angry.” Given the over-ascription of anger 
to black Americans, discerning where there is really the feeling of anger is far from trivial. Key represents 
a widely shared sentiment that Obama was secretly angry. Smith interprets Coates as angry. Figures 
such as Frederick Douglass and Malcolm X are often held up as paradigms of black anger, but in reality 
they just straightforwardly describe the world as they see it, a world different than that seen through 
the cloudy glasses of white supremacy, making whites (and some blacks) hear anger. The figure of 
Martin Luther King, Jr. stands in this ambivalence. Officially, he distances himself from the anger that 
he ascribes to the emerging black nationalists organizing under the slogan of “black power” (King ch. 
2). Yet commentators often see King himself as angry: “You cannot read or hear him without feeling 
that palpable sense of frustration, fury, and anger,” with an “impatience born of rage” motivating the 
“Letter from Birmingham Jail” (Smith “The Rebirth”).  
The same ambivalence is found in James Baldwin, whose words are often cited to represent the 
centrality of rage in black American life: 
 
To be a Negro in this country and to be relatively conscious, is to be in a rage almost all the time. So that the 
first problem is how to control that rage so that it won’t destroy you. Part of the rage is this: it isn’t only what 
is happening to you, but it’s what’s happening all around you all of the time, in the face of the most 
extraordinary and criminal indifference, the indifference and ignorance of most white people in this country. 
(“The Negro’s Role” 81) 
 
Baldwin speaks these words while he is responding to a question the journalist Nat Hentoff poses about 
balancing artistic and social responsibilities. While Baldwin starts by naming this rage, he goes on to 
assert that writers actually must distance themselves from rage because it leads to excessive simplicity 
and ultimately provinciality. “You have to decide that you can’t spend the rest of your life cursing out 
everybody that gets in your way” (“The Negro’s” 81). The task of the writer is not as straightforward as 
turning individual anger into a symphony, as Lorde asserts, or giving it a theoretical framework, as 
Ahmed asserts. Rather, Baldwin says that “the suffering of any people is really universal,” and the task 
of the writer is to tell stories that allow readers to feel what others feel, and so deepen their appreciation 
of the human condition and its essentially tragic nature (“The Negro’s” 81). In short, black rage 
motivates storytelling, which is hard, disciplined work; storytelling allows for a broader appreciation of 
our shared humanity. Baldwin, far from being an exponent of black rage and so a forefather of the rage 
of millennial black activists today, is at best ambivalent. Perhaps we can take inspiration from his turn 
to narrative, reading the ostensibly historical accounts of hooks, Smith, and others not as direct 
participation in a tradition of blacks feeling angry but rather as storytelling, as rage motivating a story 




James Baldwin also wrote about rage in his autobiographical essay, “Notes of a Native Son.” The essay 
is a coming of age story structured around the death of Baldwin’s father and Baldwin’s own ascent into 
manhood in a racist nation. The centerpiece of the essay is an account of rage. Baldwin goes to a diner, 
the waitress tells him blacks are not served there, and Baldwin feels “colder and more murderous than 
                                                 
4 Smith further argues that Obama’s message of hope, in particular, functioned to mute black rage (“The Rebirth”). 
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ever.”5 He reports that he desired to strangle the waitress, but she was standing too far away. Baldwin 
throws a glass of water at her but misses, breaking a mirror behind her. The young Baldwin realizes 
that rage of that sort can only lead to his death – he attributes his father’s death to rage that was 
impossible to express, turned into mental illness – and he decides to live differently. His father wanted 
him to be a preacher, but the young Baldwin decides to be a writer. He separates himself from his father 
and his father’s anger, and he becomes an adult. The affect that once ran uncontrolled through him is 
now channeled into the norms of prose.  
Put another way, Baldwin’s anger in the diner was the anger of a child desiring an object (supper), 
not getting it, and raging. Through learning to write, and through narrating an account of his own earlier 
anger, Baldwin enters a normative world. It is not a distinctively black normative world, 
incommensurable with the dominant one; rather, it is the multiracial world of America, complete with 
forms of domination but also with music and love and joy. Baldwin’s father, like the figure of the father 
more generally in our psychic life, represents a bridge from childhood, where the father establishes a 
normative world that is absolute and comforting, to adulthood, where the norms of the real world are 
opaque. In the real world, we will make mistakes discerning what it is we ought to do, and even when 
we try our best we will still receive the world’s reprimand. This is the tragic nature of the world. Indeed, 
Baldwin suggests that he encounters this early, for he is aware that his father, as a black father, is 
never an absolute authority, that the white world puts his father’s authority under erasure. Because of 
this dynamic, black Americans have particular insight into the human condition: they perceive the tragic 
nature of the normative world in a fuller sense than white Americans, who are motivated by a desire for 
stability that leads to delusion. 
Baldwin’s narrative positions black rage in childhood, in contrast to the disciplined performances of 
adulthood that might be fueled, at some level, by passion, but that are always at a distance from raw 
anger. We find similar narratives, also centered around childhood anger and coming to terms with 
fathers, in the autobiographies of Barack Obama and Ta-Nehisi Coates (and, at the cultural and political 
level, in Obama’s race speech). What is so striking about recent autobiographical writings by black 
activists is that they decisively reject this narrative structure. They pivot away from the ambivalence 
and potential complicity that anger (of fathers, of an earlier generation) overcome or sublimated implies. 
Often, there is no coming to terms with the father. Fathers are absent; when they are present, they are 
abusive. The anger at desire thwarted is not sublimated into the symbolic, into a shared normative 
world. It is present at the surface. It is directed against systems of domination, particularly patriarchy 
and white supremacy. Those systems are faulted for taking away fathers, for making it impossible to 
enter a shared normative order.  
A few years after the height of Black Lives Matter activism, leading figures associated with the 
movement have moved from protest to memoir. Smith published his in 2016, with a memoir by Black 
Lives Matter co-founder Patrisse Cullors published in 2017 and memoirs by activists Darnell Moore, 
Austin Channing Brown, and Brittney Cooper following in 2018. These authors, in their late 20s or 30s, 
present an entirely different sort of narrative than black memoirists even a half-generation older. The 
acclaimed books of Roxanne Gay, Tracy K. Smith, and Elizabeth Alexander, black writers in their 40s 
and 50s who circulate in elite media and cultural spaces, fit comfortably with “program era” prose, 
products of and contributors to the world of MFA programs (McGurl). They embrace multiculturalism, 
sharing the uniqueness of their black stories as part of the uniqueness of the American story, leaving 
the complicity implied by this position unchallenged. All anger is polished away, even memories of 
childhood anger. Whatever anger they experienced as children is retroactively read as frustration to be 
overcome, a learning experience on the path to bourgeois selfhood. The new memoirs, in contrast, 
emerge not from the rarified experience of MFA programs but from the free-form world of blogging and 
tweeting. Though certainly the New York publishing world has a heavy hand in shaping their form, 
something raw remains; they are not polished all the way down. 
All five of these recent Black Lives Matter-associated memoirists grew up in poor or lower-middle 
class conditions, and all but Smith grew up without a father at home. They are not heirs to an earlier 
generation of blacks who have overcome. Like the larger activist culture from which they emerge, each 
memoirist is deeply suspicious of aspirations to respectability. Male and female alike, they whole-
heartedly embrace feminism and present it as an essential part of their self-understanding and their 
coming to terms with themselves and with American racism. They embrace “intersectional” analysis, 
even if the term is not always present (perhaps because it was sullied by its association with Hillary 
                                                 
5 Baldwin actually describes his feeling here not as “anger” but as “hatred” (Notes of a Native Son, 96). We might 
read this as suggesting misdirected anger, hardened onto an individual or group rather than responsive to specific 
wrongs or a set of wrongs.  
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Clinton’s 2016 campaign, in the eyes of young activists). They worry about homophobia, and they 
describe the complexity of intimate relations in ways that do not presume a teleology toward marriage.6 
And they all see activism and anti-racist analysis as integral to their lives. This is performed in the texts 
themselves, each of which integrates memoir and social analysis. 
Of the five memoirists, Brown positions herself the most closely to the establishment. She is a 
diversity professional, working for non-profit organizations to educate others, especially white 
Americans, about race. She is also a Christian, having embraced black Christianity on a visit to her 
father’s house, attended Catholic schools, and followed a career path leading through loosely evangelical 
organizations. Despite this association with bourgeois respectability, Brown fully embraces the 
vocabulary of millennial black activism, including anger. Indeed, she devotes a chapter to “creative 
anger,” ostensibly aimed at making black rage legible to a mixed audience while resisting sublimation. 
Her book as a whole recounts numerous instances of racism, overt and subtle, that Brown has faced, 
and in the chapter she describes these and more incidents as “indignities” that motivate her anger 
(120). While some of these indignities are faced by Brown herself, she also describes her anger flowing 
from a sense of connection with the black community as a whole when any member of that community 
is wronged. Hearing whites mock the body of Serena Williams, call Michelle Obama a monkey, or 
appropriate black culture makes Brown mad. 
Yet Brown cannot express her anger since black “anger is considered dangerous, explosive, and 
unwarranted” (123). When she is angry, she is considered irrational, and her interlocutors feel like they 
can just wait until her anger cools and she returns to the realm of rationality. At first she would avoid 
revealing her anger to audiences, instead communicating “pain, disappointment, sadness,” with her 
anger lurking in a “boil, below the surface” (124). Then, she discovered the writings of James Baldwin 
and Audre Lorde. She realized that embracing her anger could fuel her creative engagement with the 
world and could allow her to forge deep connections with others. Brown came to recognize her anger in 
the anger of her God, and she came to see anger leading toward freedom.  
Smith also narrates a childhood and youth out of touch with his anger – even though he reports that 
he read Malcolm X’s autobiography in the second grade. He didn’t fully understand it then, he admits, 
but he did when he read it in high school, and in college he fashioned himself a radical, surrounding 
himself with books marking his radicalism. He tells a story of his boiling rage coming to the surface after 
his first year in college that closely parallels Baldwin’s account of his experience at the diner. Smith was 
working in a Walmart over the summer when he was approached by Marine recruiters. He couldn’t 
contain himself and goes on a tirade against them. “I had reached my breaking point,” he reflects. He 
ascribes his explosion not only to his own situation, struggling to find his identity at college, working at 
Walmart, but also to “the options for young black men in America,” namely, “cog or killer” (Invisible 
Man 43). Indeed, Smith was not directly wronged by these Marines; his rage was displaced onto them 
from other wrongs. But Smith did not yet sense how to channel this rage. “I felt an anger that was 
wholly new to me. The irony is that I went back to work more productive than before, burning off the 
energy produced by my rage” (Invisible Man 43). 
Like hooks, Smith was feeling anger at the wrong time. It made him lonely, disconnected. But the 
times changed. Black anger, particularly the anger of black youth at the imprisonment of black children 
in Jena, Louisiana, in 2006, became increasingly visible. That one of the boys arrested in Jena was, 
coincidentally, named Mychal confirmed Smith’s connection with the national outrage that was beginning 
to be expressed, albeit under the radar of mainstream media. At first he just had a raw, emotional 
reaction to learning about Jena, “grunts and screams and fucks” (Invisible Man 102). Then, he attempted 
to take action, using his perch as college newspaper editor to generate interest in and outrage at the 
Jena case. He realized that he need not aspire to respectability, like his father and an earlier generation. 
He could dwell in his rage. Just like Baldwin’s father, Smith portrays his father as a mysterious, absolute 
authority. But where Baldwin narrates a history of coming to terms with a (deceased) father, Smith 
does not succeed in such reconciliation. In fact, the anger produced by the wrongs of white supremacy, 
ranging from the shooting of his impoverished cousin to the internalized racism of black college 
administrators, festers, eventually bringing Smith to mental breakdown. The response is not a 
triumphant overcoming but rather – and here Smith follows the activist discourse closely – an embrace 
                                                 
6 Brown is an outlier here, with her Christianity motivating more sympathy for “Christian” morality, albeit inflected 
by Brown’s critique of white supremacy and patriarchy. Cooper admits to fantasies of conventional romance, though 
she describes her own, actual personal life in far-from-heteronormative terms (Eloquent Rage). 
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of self-care and loving community to help manage his mental health so that his anger can continue to 
rage.7  
Darnell Moore and Patrisse Khan-Cullors both played roles in shaping the organizational infrastructure 
accompanying Black Lives Matter, and they jointly led a national convergence on Ferguson, Missouri, 
bringing activists from around the country to the epicenter of protest. Both tell stories of particularly 
rough childhoods lived in poverty, Khan-Cullors in southern California and Moore in Camden, New Jersey. 
Neither speaks as much about their own anger as the other memoirists, perhaps because it is so 
naturally the result of their upbringing. Moore, for example, recounts an incident from his youth when 
a neighborhood child pours gasoline on him and tries to light him on fire. (Happily the wind keeps 
blowing out the match.) Surely this made Moore angry, though this goes unspoken; instead, Moore 
writes of the anger of OB, his bully. “What made him so angry he would want to kill me? I knew little 
about his family and personal life, but I knew enough. I knew the immense poverty he and his siblings 
endured, and I knew that the violence that had become mundane in our neighborhood had begun to 
shape him in the same ways it had started to shape me” (82-3). Instead of telling stories about childhood 
anger worked through, Moore narrates his childhood as one where he inhabited a world of anger – which 
he still inhabits in the present. The anger prompted by the wrongs he suffered himself is less important 
than the anger that circulated among the black community in Camden, all of it motivated by the wrongs 
of white supremacy. When Moore watches videos from Ferguson in the aftermath of Michael Brown’s 
death, he recognizes that same swirl of anger, he finds it in his friends, and they work together to 
respond in a way that builds community among young blacks and directs anger toward white supremacy.  
Moore’s father was abusive to his mother and to Moore himself. After a long absence, Moore happens 
to meet his father late at night, on his way home from a night in the Philadelphia gay scene. Moore 
realizes that the same anger he wields against white supremacy is directed against his father, and he 
describes that anger as “a form of protection” against the abandonment and hurt he felt from his father. 
Unexpectedly reunited at a Camden bus stop, Moore “was tempted to forgive him, but doing so would 
have stripped me of the only weapon I had mastered” (182). He does not forgive; he seeks to live a life 
that is both angry and loving. He builds a community of friends and lovers who care for each other, and 
he learns to allow his love to dampen his anger when it concerns those in his community. He learns to 
direct that anger only outward, at the forces of white supremacy, seemingly part of another normative 
world. 
Brittney Cooper participates in, and has been acclaimed in, activist spaces, academic spaces, and 
social media spaces. She is one of the founders of the Crunk Feminist Collective, a group of black 
Southern women academics who curate online discussions at the intersection of race and gender. In 
quick succession Cooper published a scholarly book, Beyond Respectability, and a book aimed for a 
wider, trade audience, Eloquent Rage. While aimed at different audiences and employing quite different 
styles, the two books do, in a certain sense, form a pair. The tradition of black women intellectuals has, 
Cooper asserts, been understood as developing and disseminating ideas about black respectability. 
Cooper argues that black women intellectuals did more than just this, and close attention to their work 
and lives will reveal that they even challenged certain conventional notions of respectability at the same 
time they ostensibly advocated for respectability. Cooper argues that it is essential to disambiguate 
respectability and dignity, the former associated with status or honor and the latter associated with 
inherent human worth. Cooper claims that the common denominator of the various projects in the black 
female intellectual tradition is dignity (Beyond 5). 
Black women intellectuals assert black dignity because they experience indignity, because they are 
indignant. In other words, anger underlies their intellectual work, anger that was repressed (because of 
the times) and then redirected into accounts of dignity. Cooper herself, a twenty-first century black 
woman intellectual, no longer has to repress and channel her indignity. She can express it directly, in 
her Eloquent Rage. Respectability was a provisional strategy that rose “to the level of ideology”; now it 
is time for “Black women’s rage” to be expressed as “a kind of orchestrated fury” (Cooper, Eloquent 
152-3). The Williams sisters endured the tennis world’s racism and turned it into orchestrated fury on 
the court; Cooper announces that she will do the same in the realm of memoir and cultural criticism. 
For Cooper, such rage starts not with her father but with her mother. The exemplary moment of rage, 
in Cooper’s narrative, is when her mother interrupts a black preacher condescending to a group of 
working class women, telling them how they ought to raise their children. “My mama didn’t turn over 
any tables in the temple like her Jesus might have done, but she did cause just enough of a disruption 
to make clear that an injustice was being done” (Eloquent 161). The mother’s anger responds to a 
                                                 
7 Like Baldwin, Smith eventually finds writing as a vocation, but it is writing that (in his portrayal) centers rather 
than sublimates anger. 
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wrong, calls attention to that wrong. Such individual acts of rage, Cooper cautions, are not enough. 
They must me organized, “orchestrated,” in order to combat systemic injustice, and in order for anger 
to pivot away from complicity.  
But Cooper’s rage, and her mother’s, is ultimately narrated. It promises purity, an alliance formed 
beyond the normative world of the father, against that world. It promises unadulterated “righteousness” 
that interrupts and invites us to imagine a new world, a loving world (Eloquent 166). Perhaps such 
projects call for a different genre, not the realism of the memoir, governed unavoidably by the literary 
law of the father, but science fiction – or, perhaps, mysticism. 
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